


Oman (2)

(Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia)



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... 10

134

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH HIS MAJESTY, QABOOS BIN SAID,
THE SULTAN OF OMAN

(Pronounced: Ka-boose. Addressed: Your Majesty)

Thursday, January 9
2:30 p.m. (no translation)
The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

I. PURPOSE

This is Sultan Qaboos' first substantive visit to the U.S. as Ruler and the first recent visit of an Omani head of state, although the U.S. has had diplomatic relations with Oman since 1833, longer than with any other Arabian Peninsula nation.

Your purpose in receiving the Sultan is to reaffirm our interest in strengthening relations with Oman and the Gulf states, to encourage the Sultan's enlightened leadership in coping with the problems of modernization and a Communist-supported insurgency in his Dhofar province, and to broaden his understanding of our strategy and objectives on the Middle East situation.

Oman is strategically located at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; much of the world's oil exports transit its territorial waters. The Sultan's relatively cosmopolitan approach towards foreign policy and his moderation have gained the respect both of the Saudis and Iranians, who have encouraged this visit and who remain deeply interested in the stability and moderation of the Oman regime.

It is in our interests, both for regional stability and in the context of the broader Middle East situation, to encourage the Sultan in his policies and to develop a sound dialogue with him on matters of mutual interest, building upon the long-standing ties that have existed between our two countries.

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HR 6/21/02

~~SECRET~~

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The Sultan views his visit here as an opportunity to establish personal ties and strengthen relations with the American leadership and to burnish his own image as a traditional but progressive monarch at home and in the Arab world.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: There are no issues dividing our two governments and our involvement with Oman has been limited in the past. Oman supports the Arab cause on Israel, but dispassionately. While it complied with the Arab oil boycott, it did not reduce its 300,000 barrel per day production. Oman seeks a Middle East settlement because it feels that will undercut radical influence in the area. While oil accounts for almost all of Oman's revenues, it is not a member of OPEC and plays a passive role on oil prices.

Oman's main link with the West has been in a 150-year old relationship with the British who still maintain an air base there and are intimately involved in the Omani bureaucracy and military. We have supported the UK presence as encouraging the continuation of a moderate and pro-Western regime as a bulwark against the radical policies of neighboring South Vietnam.

Oman obtains most of its military equipment from the UK but it has also recently sought to obtain some US equipment. Our policy, as in the Gulf generally, has been to be as forthcoming as our own supply situation permits, in the context of Oman's legitimate security needs. We have recently had to decline an Omani bid to buy TOW anti-tank missiles because we did not have them available.

Other than a small Peace Corps presence, we do not have an aid program in Oman. Oman has asked for technical assistance on a reimbursable basis through government-to-government channels and we are trying to be as helpful as possible. Direct private US business involvement in Oman is growing.

With the emergence of a number of new independent states in the lower Gulf since the departure of the British three years ago, we have assigned individual resident Ambassadors to these states.

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Ambassador Wolle was assigned as the first US Ambassador to Oman in July of last year.

Our policy towards Oman has been to encourage its economic development and its fight against the rebellion in Dhofar, without becoming directly involved, in line with our broader posture of encouraging the leading states in the Gulf to assume responsibility for regional stability. This has included our encouragement of UK efforts and of regional economic and military assistance, mainly from Iran but also from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

Sultan Qaboos has been appreciative of US efforts and has also recently been reassured as to the wisdom of his policies by the fact that UK military involvement in Dhofar was not affected by the recent British Defense Policy Review. He is likely to look to you for an affirmation of our continued support of his Government's counter-insurgency efforts in Dhofar through encouraging regional cooperation and direct sales of military equipment, when it is not readily available from other sources. I believe our strategy should be to reassure him on this point and on our general desire to be as responsive as possible (on a reimbursable basis) to any Omani request related to the country's economic development.

B. Participants: Sultan Qaboos, Foreign Minister Zawawi, the Sultan's uncle and personal advisor, Sayyid Tarik, Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft.

C. Press: Press photo session at the beginning of the meeting and a short summary statement by Mr. Nessen following the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I want to welcome you warmly to the United States and express my hope that your visit here will be pleasant and constructive. [The Sultan will be meeting with me, Secretary Schlesinger, Director Colby and Vice President Rockefeller.]
2. U.S. relations with Oman are long-standing, dating back to 1833. With the assignment of Ambassador Wolle to Oman last summer we look forward to an even closer relationship in the future.

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3. We have followed your leadership with great interest and admire and respect the policies which you have set for your country.
4. In particular, I know that you face a great challenge in combatting the South-Yemen backed rebellion in Dhofar. I am aware of the progress being made under your leadership. We believe regional cooperation offers the best way for the U.S. to support Oman. As you know, we have given support to the efforts of Iran and the UK as well as Jordan and Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in helping Oman meet this challenge.
5. You are to be complimented for the rapid economic progress that Oman is making under your leadership. The record has been impressive and I applaud your efforts.
6. I know that your Government is interested in technical assistance on a reimbursable basis. We will continue to be as helpful as possible and will seek to locate personnel with the technical skills you desire. We seek closer relations between our two countries and the further development of mutual cooperation, especially in the economic and development fields.
7. On the issue of military assistance, the U.S. is prepared to sell Oman military equipment needed for its defense, to the degree our supply situation permits.
8. We believe you are right in trying to integrate the population of Dhofar into the national economy so they can see the natural benefits of support for your government.
9. Britain is a traditional ally of Oman. We will continue to encourage the British to keep up their support. Where we can be of supplemental help with technical assistance and weapons we will do our best but we think you can be the best judge of when and where U.S. help may be needed.
10. On the broader Middle East situation, we remain committed to continuing our efforts towards an overall settlement.

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We appreciate Oman's understanding of our approach, which we believe in the present circumstances must continue to be a step by step process.

11. I am very much interested in hearing your views on the situation in the region in general as well as in Oman, including the problem of Dhofar.

Tab A -- Biography of Sultan Qaboos
Tab B -- Biography of Foreign Minister Zawawi
Tab C -- Biography of the Sultan's uncle and personal advisor,
Sayyid Tarik
Tab D -- Map of Oman
Tab E -- Background paper on the Dhofar Rebellion
Tab F -- Biography of Ambassador Macki, Oman's Ambassador
in Washington

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 015921

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Biography

DESCRIPTION Omani Visitor
CREATION DATE 12/1974
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700408
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
BOX NUMBER 26
FOLDER TITLE Oman (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/21/2002
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Biography

DESCRIPTION Omani Visitor
CREATION DATE 09/12/1974
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700408
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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WITHDRAWAL ID 015923

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Biography

DESCRIPTION Omani Visitor
CREATION DATE 08/23/1974
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700408
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
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FOLDER TITLE Oman (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/21/2002
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
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 015924

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Biography

DESCRIPTION Omani Visitor
CREATION DATE 12/1974?
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700408
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
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BACKGROUND PAPER

The Dhofar Rebellion

The insurgency in the Sultanate of Oman began in the early 1960s as an indigenous tribal uprising against the repressive policies of Sultan Qaboos' father. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) took over the rebellion in the late 1960s, and has used it to promote that organization's area-wide goals. The PFLO is Arab nationalist, marxist, revolutionary, anti-Western, and anti-Iranian.

As a result of Oman's strategic importance--the Musandam Peninsula juts into the Strait of Hormuz, the outlet of the Persian Gulf--the Dhofar rebellion has drawn in several outside states:

- The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) provides extensive material and propaganda support to the PFLO. PDRY itself receives military equipment from the USSR, and advisors from the USSR, Cuba, and East Germany. PDRY also has shelled from its own territory Omani outposts on the disputed Dhofar border.
- Iran has recently expanded its military support of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) with a 3,000-man brigade and supporting units. Tehran also has transport aircraft and helicopters in Oman, and expects this month to base F-5 fighter aircraft in Dhofar.
- Great Britain continues its military relationship with Oman by having seconded and retired British officers and NCOs serving with the SAF.
- Jordan currently has an engineering company serving in Oman, and plans to add an infantry battalion to the SAF.

The Military Situation

The Dhofar rebellion is a guerrilla conflict in which quick fire-fights, long-range shelling, and mine warfare are the rule. With

- the destruction of the PFLO subversive apparatus in northern Oman,

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY LR, NARA, DATE 6/21/02

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- the construction of the Hornbeam Line (a series of fortified posts west of Salalah, the capital of Dhofar, to restrict PFLO supply efforts), and
- the clearing of the Salalah-Midway road area by Iranian troops,

the initiative has returned to the SAF.

In an effort to strike a decisive blow, the SAF planned a fall offensive to sweep the western area of Dhofar, capture the main rebel supply caves, and thereby cut the rebels off from effective logistical support from PDRY. This offensive, however, was delayed until early December.

During the past few weeks, PFLO units have handed the well-equipped Iranian troops several setbacks. They have sustained over 70 casualties so far, while failing to accomplish most of their objectives. British observers have attributed these failures to lack of experience in guerrilla warfare. The SAF is now bringing in one of its battalions from east of the Hornbeam Line to act as a sweep force, while the Iranians hold the positions they have already taken. Once the Iranians gain combat experience, and when additional SAF troops have been released for combat by the arrival of the Jordanian battalion, the Sultan's forces may succeed in gaining the upper hand over the rebels. Nonetheless, a low level of rebel activity is expected to continue in Dhofar as long as PDRY provides a minimum of material support. SAF successes, however, may force the PFLO to change its strategy from overt guerrilla warfare to covert terrorist activities in the populated areas of northern Oman.

Arab Concern Over the Iranian Presence in Dhofar

The Omanis do not appear to have any qualms about Iranian participation in the struggle against the insurgents. Nonetheless, other Arab governments, suspicious that the Iranians have expansionist ambitions to establish a permanent presence on the Arab side of the Gulf, have expressed concern both publicly and in private. As a result, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have proposed the creation of a pan-Arab force to serve in Dhofar. Although the ultimate purpose of such a force has been left vague, it is undoubtedly intended to replace the Iranians. In principle neither the Sultan nor the Shah opposes a pan-Arab force, but both are skeptical that it will materialize in the near future. As a result, Oman is proceeding with its own plans for the conduct of the war, hoping for whatever help it can get from the Arabs, but relying primarily upon its own forces, supplemented by assistance from Iran.

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BIOGRAPHY - Ahmed Macki

Sultanate of Oman

Ahmed Abdul Nabi Macki, Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, served previously as Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Described as by all odds the most able man in the Foreign Ministry and one of the most capable men in the Omani government, Macki was born in 1939. From 1959 to 1962 he studied in Cairo, and from 1962-65 in Paris, where he says he unlearned the political philosophy the Egyptians tried to teach him in Cairo. Macki headed the Omani student organization while in Egypt and received a B.A. in Commerce from Cairo University in 1965. He was greatly affected by his stay in France and has expressed the view that more Omanis should be educated in the West to balance the number of Omanis who were forced to study in communist countries in the 60's for lack of alternate opportunities.

After his studies he worked for some time for UNESCO in Paris and then as an advisor to a Canadian firm in Abu Dhabi. Following the accession of Sultan Qabus, Macki returned to Oman to become Director of the Prime Minister's office in 1971 and then temporarily Omani representative to the UN for the 1971 and 1972 UNGA sessions. He was appointed Undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry in February 1972. Described as a strong personality, Macki has frequently travelled abroad on behalf of Sultan Qabus on delicate missions.

Besides his native Arabic, Macki speaks English and French. He is married to a French and English-speaking Spanish national, the former Piedad Manso-Fernandez. They have one child, a 3 year old daughter named Dina.

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GDS--DECLAS Dec. 31, 1980

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1975

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

Subject: Visit of Oman's Sultan Qaboos Ibn Al-bu Sa'id

I. PURPOSE

Oman is important to US interests because it is in a geographic position (with Iran) to control the Strait of Hormuz, through which two thirds of the world's oil exports pass. Its stability is a matter of prime concern to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Underdeveloped and isolated diplomatically until Qaboos took power in 1970, Oman is the only country in the Arabian Peninsula confronted with a guerrilla insurgency, which has been underway in its southwestern province of Dhofar which borders Marxist South Yemen, the principal supporter of the rebels.

Sultan Qaboos comes at a time of rapid economic development in Oman made possible by increased oil revenues, and continuing but slow success in the war against communist-led guerrillas. He will be here on a nominally private visit, but sees this as an opportunity to strengthen his relationship with American leaders and to burnish his own image as a traditional but progressive monarch both at home and in the Arab world generally. For us, it provides a chance to strengthen our ties with one of the Persian Gulf states, show our interest in Oman's efforts to develop its economy and defend its territory, and indicate our appreciation for the Sultan's own efforts in resisting communist-backed subversion emanating from South Yemen.

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GDS

HR 6/21/02

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Your purpose in this meeting will be:

-- to reassure Qaboos that we value our historically friendly relations in Oman;

-- to encourage him to continue his struggle against the insurgency in Dhofar, looking to friendly regional states for support;

-- to compliment Qaboos on his determination to pursue a policy of rapid economic development and reiterate our willingness to cooperate in providing technical assistance on a reimbursable basis;

-- to assure him of your personal commitment to work towards a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

II. BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

A. Background. There are no issues dividing our two governments, and our involvement with Oman has been limited. Oman supports the Arab cause on Israel, but dispassionately. While it complied with the Arab oil boycott, it did not reduce its 300,000 barrel per day production. The Omanis want a Middle East settlement primarily because they feel it will undercut radical influence in the area. Petroleum, produced primarily by a British-led consortium, accounts for almost all of Oman's exports and revenues. Oman is currently earning \$800 million from its oil; however, it is not a member of OPEC and plays a passive role on oil prices.

For over 150 years British interests, both commercial and military, have been paramount in Oman. The British still have an air base there. The Sultan himself studied at Sandhurst. The Commander in Chief of his armed forces is a seconded British Major General. His de facto Minister of Finance and Development is an expatriate Australian, and his special personal advisor is an expatriate Canadian and former Sandhurst classmate. The Omani Army is led by some 300 British officers - about half on contract and half seconded from the regular

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British army. We support the continuing British involvement in Oman since it: (a) helps to assure the continuation of a moderate and pro-western regime sharing control of the entrance to the Persian Gulf with Iran, and (b) serves as a bulwark against the expansionary revolutionary designs of the Marxist regime in neighboring South Yemen.

The Omani armed forces obtain most of their military equipment from Britain. However, Oman has sought to purchase some US military items, and our policy has been to be as forthcoming as our own supply situation permits in the context of Oman's legitimate needs. However, three months ago we had to turn down an Omani bid to buy 100 TOW anti-tank missiles because we did not have them available.

We do not have an aid program in Oman, other than some 30 Peace Corps volunteers involved in such things as development of agriculture and water resources, nursing and public health. Oman has increasingly asked for technical assistance on a reimbursable basis through the Government-to-Government channel, and in such cases we try to be as helpful as possible. At the present time, for example, we are arranging to send to Oman (at Oman's expense) three air control specialists from FAA and a rural electrification expert. Direct private American business involvement in Oman is growing as well in such diverse fields as food processing, port construction, fisheries development, and legal assistance, and Sun Oil is currently preparing to explore promising areas off Oman's southern coast.

In line with the growth of our relations with Oman, we appointed a resident US ambassador to Muscat for the first time in July of this year. Our relations go all the way back to 1833, when we signed a treaty of friendship and navigation with the Sultanate.

B. Strategy. Our basic policy towards Oman has been to support the country's economic development efforts and its fight against foreign-backed insurgency in Dhofar without ourselves becoming directly involved in

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-4-

that conflict. We have successfully followed this policy through support of continued British involvement in Oman and encouragement of regional military assistance (primarily from Iran, but also to a limited degree from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia). The Iranians, at Omani request, have an expeditionary force in Dhofar, currently consisting basically of one infantry brigade with air support. The Jordanians have provided an expert military engineer company.

Sultan Qaboos appreciates our active encouragement of the regional support he has been receiving. He is reassured by the fact that British military involvement in Dhofar has not been affected by the recent Wilson Government Defense Policy Review. He is likely to be looking for an affirmation from you of our continued support of his government's counterinsurgency efforts in Dhofar through encouraging regional cooperation and direct sale of military equipment needed and not readily available from other countries. I believe our strategy should be to reassure him on this point and on our general desire to be as responsive as possible (on a reimbursable basis) to any Omani request related to the country's economic development.

III. TALKING POINTS

General

-- We appreciate your dynamic leadership in meeting the threat of subversion emanating from South Yemen; Oman is the front line for peninsula security.

-- You are to be complimented on the rapid progress Oman has made since you came to power in 1970 and began to earn substantial oil revenues. Your economic development in the last four years has been very impressive. I applaud your concern that this development serve the well-being of all your countrymen.

-- Let me assure you of my personal commitment to a just and lasting Middle East peace. The United States will continue actively to work towards this goal. We appreciate Oman's understanding of our approach, which

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-5-

we believe in the present circumstances must continue to be a step by step one.

US-Omani Relations

-- First, I wish to emphasize my Government's basic policy and desire to promote increasingly close relations between our two countries and to foster mutual cooperation, especially in the economic and developmental field. As you know, we have 30 Peace Corps volunteers in Oman.

-- Your Government has approached us on several occasions seeking technical assistance, on a reimbursable basis. We will continue to be as helpful as we can and seek to locate personnel with the technical skills you desire.

-- We are also very much aware of heartening progress Oman is making in meeting the challenge of externally supported subversion in Dhofar. We see encouragement of regional cooperation as the best way for the United States to support Oman in its courageous response to this threat. Thus, as you know, we have given diplomatic support to the efforts of Iran and the UK, as well as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other friendly states, in helping Oman to meet this problem.

-- If at all possible, the United States is prepared to sell Oman military equipment needed for its defense. We support Oman's strategy of pacification in Dhofar. We know from our experience in Vietnam that there can be no ultimate "pacification" until the local population is closely integrated with the national government and benefiting from this connection through economic development.

-- Britain is a traditional ally of Oman. We have no desire to displace it in Oman or even compete. On the contrary, we will continue to urge the British to keep up their support. We think they are doing a creditable job. Where we can be of supplemental help - with technical assistance and weapons - we will do our best, but we think you can be the best judge of when and where we are needed.

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-6-

-- I would be interested in your views on the possibility of an eventual political settlement of the Dhofar insurgency with South Yemen. We, ourselves, have no influence with the South Yemen regime, and that regime has shown no real signs of interest in improving relations with us despite our receptivity to the idea. But we could help line up international support for you and help you coordinate any initiative with other states in the area, if you so desired.

IV. PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS

A. Participants. Sultan Qaboos will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Zawawi, his uncle and personal advisor Sayyid Tarik, and Oman's Ambassador Macki. I also intend to be present. An interpreter will not be necessary, as all speak fluent English.

B. Press. The meeting has been announced; since this is an essentially private visit, there will be no arrival ceremony; there will, however, be a photo session at the start of your meeting.

Attachments:

- (1) Biographic sketches.
- (2) Background on the Dhofar Rebellion.

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13
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8 Jan p.m.

Kathy:

Attached is a zerox of the
retyped version of # 134.

Original to be signed Thursday
a.m. and forwarded to President.

Wilma

1/c
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 9, 1975

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Ed Roberts

The attached is for your files.
The substance was included in the
Talking paper which was sent over
last night (NSC Log #134) on the
Sultan of Oman's visit.

Thelma

Thelma M. Toles

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/1/74 BY DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/21/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC/S

Log 134 secured by phone. This will have to be logged in. It should go across the street ASAP.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing of the President for His
Meeting with Sultan Qaboos of Oman

The President has agreed to see His Majesty
Sultan Qaboos of Oman at 2:30 Thursday, January 9,
for one hour. Attached are suggested talking
points for possible use by the National Security
Advisor in briefing the President for his meeting
with Sultan Qaboos.

Suzanne S. Butcher
for George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Briefing Paper on
Oman

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GDS

HR 6/21/02



17

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

WASHINGTON

134

MEETING WITH HIS MAJESTY, QABOOS BIN SAID,
THE SULTAN OF OMAN

(Pronounced: Ka-boose. Addressed: Your Majesty)

Thursday, January 9
2:30 p.m. (no translation)
The Oval Office

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

This is Sultan Qaboos' first substantive visit to the U. S. as Ruler and the first recent visit of an Omani head of state, although the U. S. has had diplomatic relations with Oman since 1833, longer than with any other Arabian Peninsula nation.

Your purpose in receiving the Sultan is to reaffirm our interest in strengthening relations with Oman and the Gulf states, to encourage the Sultan's enlightened leadership in coping with the problems of modernization and a communist-supported insurgency in his Dhofar province, and to broaden his understanding of our strategy and objectives on the Middle East situation.

Oman (~~in addition to Iran~~) is strategically located ^{at} ~~in straddling~~ the entrance to the Persian Gulf; much of the world's oil exports transit its territorial waters. The Sultan's ^{relatively} ~~more~~ cosmopolitan approach towards foreign policy and his moderation have gained the respect of both the Saudis and Iranians, who have encouraged this visit and who remain deeply interested in the stability and moderation of the Omani regime.

It is in our interests, both for regional stability and in the context of the broader Middle East situation, to encourage the Sultan in his policies and to develop a sound dialogue with him on matters of mutual interest, building upon the long-standing ties that have existed ~~between our two countries,~~

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

HR 6/21/02



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The Sultan views his visit here as an opportunity to establish personal ties and strengthen relations with the American leadership and to burnish his own image as a traditional but progressive monarch at home and in the Arab world.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: There are no issues dividing our two governments and our involvement with Oman has been limited in the past. Oman supports the Arab cause on Israel, but dispassionately. While it complied with the Arab oil boycott, it did not reduce its 300,000 barrel per day production. Oman seeks a Middle East settlement because it feels ^{that} it will undercut radical influence in the area. While oil accounts for almost all of Oman's revenues, ^{it} ~~Oman~~ is not a member of OPEC and plays a passive role on oil prices.

Oman's main link with the West has been in a 150-year old relationship with the British who still maintain an air base there and are intimately involved in the Omani bureaucracy and military. We have supported the UK presence as encouraging the continuation of a moderate and pro-Western regime as a bulwark against the radical policies of neighboring South Yemen.

Oman obtains most of its military equipment from the UK but it has also recently sought to obtain some US equipment. Our policy, as in the Gulf generally, has been to be as forthcoming as our own supply ~~policy~~ situation permits, in the context of Oman's legitimate security needs. We have recently had to ^{decline} ~~turn aside~~ an Omani bid to buy TOW anti-tank missiles because we did not have them available.

Other than a small Peace Corps presence, we do not have an aid program in Oman. Oman has asked for technical assistance on a reimbursable basis through government-to-government channels and we are trying to be as helpful as possible. Direct private US business involvement in Oman is growing.

With the ^{evolution} ~~evolution~~ of a number of new independent states in the lower Gulf since the departure of the British three years ago,

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we have assigned individual resident Ambassadors to these states. Ambassador Wolle was assigned as the first US Ambassador to Oman in July of last year.

Our policy towards Oman has been to encourage its economic development and its fight against the rebellion in Dhofar, without becoming directly involved, in line with our broader posture of encouraging the leading states in the Gulf to assume responsibility for regional stability. This has included our encouragement of UK efforts and of regional economic and military assistance, mainly from Iran but also from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, all of whom view South Yemen as a threat to the strategic lower Gulf area.

Sultan Qaboos has been appreciative of US efforts and has also recently been reassured as to the wisdom of his policies by the fact that ~~the~~ UK military involvement in Dhofar ^{was} not ~~been~~ affected by the recent ^{British} Defense Policy Review of the ~~Wilson~~ ~~Government~~. He is likely to look to you for an affirmation of our continued support of his Government's counter-insurgency efforts in Dhofar through encouraging regional cooperation and direct sales of military equipment, ~~as needed~~, when it is not readily available from other sources. I believe our strategy should be to reassure him on this point and on our general desire to be as responsive as possible (on a reimbursable basis) to any Omani request related to the country's economic development.

B. Participants: Sultan Qaboos, ~~will be accompanied by~~ Foreign Minister Zawawi, ^{the Sultan's} ~~and by his~~ uncle and personal advisor, Sayyid Tarik, ~~I will attend together with General Scowcroft.~~ ^{Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft}

C. Press: ~~There will be a~~ press photo session at the beginning of the meeting and a short summary statement by Mr. Nessen ^{following} ~~the meeting.~~

III. TALKING POINTS:

1. I want to welcome you warmly to the United States and express my hope that your visit here will be pleasant and constructive.
[The Sultan will be meeting with me, ~~and with~~ Secretary Schlesinger,

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~~SECRET~~ -- 4

Director Colby and Vice President Rockefeller.]

2. U.S. relations with Oman are long-standing, dating back to 1833. With the assignment of ^{Wolfe} ~~an~~ Ambassador to Oman last summer (~~Ambassador Wolfe~~) we look forward to an even closer relationship in the future.
3. We have followed your leadership with great interest and admire and respect the policies which you have set ~~on~~ ~~course~~ for your country.
4. In particular, I know that you face a great challenge in combatting the South-Yemen backed rebellion in Dhofar. I am aware of the progress being made under your leadership. We believe regional cooperation offers the best way for the U.S. to support Oman. As you know, we have given support to the efforts of Iran and the UK as well as Jordan and Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in helping Oman meet this challenge.
5. ~~At the same time~~, you are to be complimented for the rapid economic progress that Oman is making under your leadership. The record has been impressive and I applaud your efforts. We ~~desire to have~~ ^{the further development of} closer relations between our two countries and to foster mutual cooperation, especially in the economic and developmental fields.
6. I know that your Government ~~has approached us seeking~~ ^{is interested} technical assistance on a reimbursable basis. We will continue to be as helpful as possible and ^{will} seek to locate personnel with the technical skills you desire. <
7. On the issue of military assistance, ~~if at all possible~~, the U.S. is prepared to sell Oman military equipment needed for its defense, ~~to the degree our supply situation permits~~.
8. We believe you are right in trying to integrate the population of Dhofar into the national economy so they can see the natural benefits of support for your Government.
9. Britain is a traditional ally of Oman. ~~We have no desire to displace it in Oman or even compete.~~ On the contrary, we

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~~SECRET~~ -- 5

will continue to encourage the British to keep up their support. ~~We think they are doing a creditable job.~~ Where we can be of supplemental help with technical assistance and weapons we will do our best but we think you can be the best judge of when and where ~~we are~~ needed.

10. On the broader Middle East situation, ^{US help may be} ~~we~~ remain committed to ~~seeing our Government~~ continue ^{with our} efforts towards an overall settlement. We appreciate Oman's understanding of our approach, which we believe in the present circumstances must continue to be a step by step ~~one~~ ^{process}.
11. I am very much interested in hearing your views on the situation in ^{the region in general as well as} ~~your area generally~~ and in Oman, including the problem of Dhofar.

Tab A -- Biography of Sultan Qaboos

Tab B -- Biography of Foreign Minister Zawawi

Tab C -- Biography of the Sultan's uncle and personal advisor,
Sayyid Tarik

Tab D -- Map of Oman

Tab E -- Background paper on the Dhofar Rebellion

Tab F -- Biography of Ambassador Macki, Oman's Ambassador in
Washington

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH HIS MAJESTY, QABOOS BIN SAID,
THE SULTAN OF OMAN

(Pronounced: Ka-boose. Addressed: Your Majesty)

Thursday, January 9
2:30 p.m. (no translation)
The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

This is Sultan Qaboos' first substantive visit to the U.S. as Ruler and the first recent visit of an Omani head of state, although the U.S. has had diplomatic relations with Oman since 1833, longer than with any other Arabian Peninsula nation.

Your purpose in receiving the Sultan is to reaffirm our interest in strengthening relations with Oman and the Gulf states, to encourage the Sultan's enlightened leadership in coping with the problems of modernization and a Communist-supported insurgency in his Dhofar province, and to broaden his understanding of our strategy and objectives on the Middle East situation.

Oman is strategically located at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; much of the world's oil exports transit its territorial waters. The Sultan's relatively cosmopolitan approach towards foreign policy and his moderation have gained the respect both of the Saudis and Iranians, who have encouraged this visit and who remain deeply interested in the stability and moderation of the Oman regime.

It is in our interests, both for regional stability and in the context of the broader Middle East situation, to encourage the Sultan in his policies and to develop a sound dialogue with him on matters of mutual interest, building upon the long-standing ties that have existed between our two countries.

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

HR 6/21/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ (GDS)
HR 6/21/02

~~SECRET~~

2

The Sultan views his visit here as an opportunity to establish personal ties and strengthen relations with the American leadership and to burnish his own image as a traditional but progressive monarch at home and in the Arab world.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: There are no issues dividing our two governments and our involvement with Oman has been limited in the past. Oman supports the Arab cause on Israel, but dispassionately. While it complied with the Arab oil boycott, it did not reduce its 300,000 barrel per day production. Oman seeks a Middle East settlement because it feels that will undercut radical influence in the area. While oil accounts for almost all of Oman's revenues, it is not a member of OPEC and plays a passive role on oil prices.

Oman's main link with the West has been in a 150-year old relationship with the British who still maintain an air base there and are intimately involved in the Omani bureaucracy and military. We have supported the UK presence as encouraging the continuation of a moderate and pro-Western regime as a bulwark against the radical policies of neighboring South Vietnam.

Oman obtains most of its military equipment from the UK but it has also recently sought to obtain some US equipment. Our policy, as in the Gulf generally, has been to be as forthcoming as our own supply situation permits, in the context of Oman's legitimate security needs. We have recently had to decline an Omani bid to buy TOW anti-tank missiles because we did not have them available.

Other than a small Peace Corps presence, we do not have an aid program in Oman. Oman has asked for technical assistance on a reimbursable basis through government-to-government channels and we are trying to be as helpful as possible. Direct private US business involvement in Oman is growing.

With the emergence of a number of new independent states in the lower Gulf since the departure of the British three years ago, we have assigned individual resident Ambassadors to these states.

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~~SECRET~~

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Ambassador Wolle was assigned as the first US Ambassador to Oman in July of last year.

Our policy towards Oman has been to encourage its economic development and its fight against the rebellion in Dhofar, without becoming directly involved, in line with our broader posture of encouraging the leading states in the Gulf to assume responsibility for regional stability. This has included our encouragement of UK efforts and of regional economic and military assistance, mainly from Iran but also from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

Sultan Qaboos has been appreciative of US efforts and has also recently been reassured as to the wisdom of his policies by the fact that UK military involvement in Dhofar was not affected by the recent British Defense Policy Review. He is likely to look to you for an affirmation of our continued support of his Government's counter-insurgency efforts in Dhofar through encouraging regional cooperation and direct sales of military equipment, when it is not readily available from other sources. I believe our strategy should be to reassure him on this point and on our general desire to be as responsive as possible (on a reimbursable basis) to any Omani request related to the country's economic development.

B. Participants: Sultan Qaboos, Foreign Minister Zawawi, the Sultan's uncle and personal advisor, Sayyid Tarik, Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft.

C. Press: Press photo session at the beginning of the meeting and a short summary statement by Mr. Nessen following the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I want to welcome you warmly to the United States and express my hope that your visit here will be pleasant and constructive. [The Sultan will be meeting with me, Secretary Schlesinger, Director Colby and Vice President Rockefeller.]
2. U.S. relations with Oman are long-standing, dating back to 1833. With the assignment of Ambassador Wolle to Oman last summer we look forward to an even closer relationship in the future.

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3. We have followed your leadership with great interest and admire and respect the policies which you have set for your country.
4. In particular, I know that you face a great challenge in combatting the South-Yemen backed rebellion in Dhofar. I am aware of the progress being made under your leadership. We believe regional cooperation offers the best way for the U.S. to support Oman. As you know, we have given support to the efforts of Iran and the UK as well as Jordan and Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in helping Oman meet this challenge.
5. You are to be complimented for the rapid economic progress that Oman is making under your leadership. The record has been impressive and I applaud your efforts.
6. I know that your Government is interested in technical assistance on a reimbursable basis. We will continue to be as helpful as possible and will seek to locate personnel with the technical skills you desire. We seek closer relations between our two countries and the further development of mutual cooperation, especially in the economic and development fields.
7. On the issue of military assistance, the U.S. is prepared to sell Oman military equipment needed for its defense, to the degree our supply situation permits.
8. We believe you are right in trying to integrate the population of Dhofar into the national economy so they can see the natural benefits of support for your government.
9. Britain is a traditional ally of Oman. We will continue to encourage the British to keep up their support. Where we can be of supplemental help with technical assistance and weapons we will do our best but we think you can be the best judge of when and where U.S. help may be needed.
10. On the broader Middle East situation, we remain committed to continuing our efforts towards an overall settlement.

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5

We appreciate Oman's understanding of our approach, which we believe in the present circumstances must continue to be a step by step process.

11. I am very much interested in hearing your views on the situation in the region in general as well as in Oman, including the problem of Dhofar.

Tab A -- Biography of Sultan Qaboos
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Tab F -- Biography of Ambassador Macki, Oman's Ambassador
in Washington

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MEMORANDUM

134

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)
HR 6/21/02

ACTION
January 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT:

Talking Paper for President's Meeting
with the Sultan of Oman -- Thursday,
January 9

At Tab I is the talking paper for the President's meeting with the Sultan of Oman tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. Under "Participants," Ambassador Macki and our Ambassador (Wolle) are not listed as I understand that decision is still pending. There is space for adding their names if desired.

We have not received the original memorandum from State signed by the Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION: That the package at Tab I be forwarded to the President.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH HIS MAJESTY, QABOOS BIN SAID,THE SULTAN OF OMAN

(Pronounced: Ka-boose, Addressed: Your Majesty)
Thursday, January 9
2:30 p.m. (no translation)
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FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

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Your purpose in receiving the Sultan is to reaffirm our interest in strengthening relations with Oman and the Gulf states, to encourage the Sultan's enlightened leadership in coping with the problems of modernization and a communist-supported insurgency in his Dhofar province, and to broaden his understanding of our strategy and objectives on the Middle East situation.

Oman (in addition to Iran) is strategically located in straddling the entrance to the Persian Gulf; much of the world's oil exports transit its territorial waters. The Sultan's more cosmopolitan approach towards foreign policy and his moderation have gained the respect of both the Saudis and Iranians who have encouraged this visit and who remain deeply interested in the stability and moderation of the Omani regime.

It is in our interests, both for regional stability and in the context of the broader Middle East situation, to encourage the Sultan in his policies and to develop a sound dialogue with him on matters of mutual interest, building upon the long-standing ties that have existed.

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HR 6/21/02



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H2 6/21/02

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2

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A. Background: There are no issues dividing our two governments and our involvement with Oman has been limited in the past. Oman supports the Arab cause on Israel, but dispassionately. While it complied with the Arab oil boycott, it did not reduce its 300,000 barrel per day production. Oman seeks a Middle East settlement because it feels that will undercut radical influence in the area. While oil accounts for almost all of Oman's revenues, it is not a member of OPEC and plays a passive role on oil prices.

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Other than a small Peace Corps presence, we do not have an aid program in Oman. Oman has asked for technical assistance on a reimbursable basis through government-to-government channels and we are trying to be as helpful as possible. Direct private US business involvement in Oman is growing.

With the emergence of a number of new independent states in the lower Gulf since the departure of the British three years ago, we have assigned individual resident Ambassadors to these states.

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Ambassador Wille was assigned as the first US Ambassador to Oman in July of last year.

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Sultan Qaboos has been appreciative of US efforts and has also recently been reassured as to the wisdom of his policies by the fact that UK military involvement in Dhofar was not affected by the recent British Defense Policy Review. He is likely to look for you for an affirmation of our continued support of his Government's counter-insurgency efforts in Dhofar through encouraging regional cooperation and direct sales of military equipment, when it is not readily available from other sources. I believe our strategy should be to reassure him on this point and on our general desire to be as responsive as possible (on a reimbursable basis) to any Omani request related to the country's economic development.

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C. Press: Press photo session at the beginning of the meeting and a short summary statement by Mr. Nessen following the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I want to welcome you warmly to the United States and express my hope that your visit here will be pleasant and constructive. [The Sultan will be meeting with me, Secretary Schlesinger, Director Colby and Vice President Rockefeller.]
2. U.S. relations with Oman are long-standing, dating back to 1833. With the assignment of Ambassador Wille to Oman last summer we look forward to an even closer relationship in the future.

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3. We have followed your leadership with great interest and admire and respect the policies which you have set for your country.
4. In particular, I know that you face a great challenge in combatting the South-Yemen backed rebellion in Dhofar. I am aware of the progress being made under your leadership. We believe regional cooperation offers the best way for the U. S. to support Oman. As you know, we have given support to the efforts of Iran and the UK as well as Jordan and Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in helping Oman meet this challenge.
5. You are to be complimented for the rapid economic progress that Oman is making under your leadership. The record has been impressive and I applaud your efforts.
6. I know that your Government is interested in technical assistance on a reimbursable basis. We will continue to be as helpful as possible and will seek to locate personnel with the technical skills you desire. We seek closer relations between our two countries and the further development of mutual cooperation, especially in the economic and development fields.
7. On the issue of military assistance, the U. S. is prepared to sell Oman military equipment needed for its defense, to the degree our supply situation permits.
8. We believe you are right in trying to integrate the population of Dhofar into the national economy so they can see the natural benefits of support for your government.
9. Britain is a traditional ally of Oman. We will continue to encourage the British to keep up their support. Where we can be of supplemental help with technical assistance and weapons we will do our best but we think you can be the best judge of when and where U. S. help may be needed.
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~~SECRET~~ - GDS

~~SECRET~~

5

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Gen S:wgh:8 Jan 75 (retyped)

~~SECRET~~ - GDS

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
01	08	01	08	18	7500134	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES	FROM: OAKLEY	REFERENCE	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
	KISSINGER	COLBY, W	S/S	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
	<u>SCOWCROFT</u>	SCHLESINGER, J	OTHER	LOU NO FORN NODIS
	DAVIS	ST EX SEC		C EYES ONLY EXDIS
				<u>S</u> CODEWORD
			TS SENSITIVE	
SUBJECT: TALKING PAPER FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE SULTAN OF OMAN -- THURSDAY, JANUARY 9.				

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
		ACTION	INFO		
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
	FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			X	MEMO TO
	EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
	LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
	UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR
	ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
	SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
	NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
	CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN)	CY TO
	1/8/75	OAKLEY	HAK	X	TALKING POINTS FOR PRES	1/9
	1/9/75		PRES		INFO	
	1/10/75		NSC/6	C	Noted by Pres	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:	
	NOTIFY & DATE BY	
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION:	
	CROSS REF W/ 7405883	
	SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:	FOLDER:
		MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
		M/F'D BY
		CRT ID: 1075
		OPEN PA
		CLOSE
		SA SF HP NS WH EP PA DY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

157 2
URGENT VIA LDX
January 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT:

Attendance a President's Meeting Today
with the Sultan of Oman and in Cabinet
Room -- s/s 7500222 and 7500494

The President's meeting with the Sultan of Oman today shall include on the Omani side Foreign Minister Zawawi and the Sultan's uncle, Sayyid Tarik.

Ambassador Macki and Ambassador Wolle may accompany but should join the group State has recommended (s/s 7500494) be present in the Cabinet Room -- Mr. Ghassan Shakir, Mr. Yahya Omar and possibly Minister Rajab, along with Assistant Secretary Atherton and Ambassador Catto. Mr. Arthur Houghton of the NSC Staff will also be present.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D C 20520

S/S 7500494

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January 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call by Sultan Qaboos of Oman on the
President, Thursday, January 9,
2:30 p.m.

The Omanis have sought to expand the number of their own participants in the Sultan's meeting with the President, but have acquiesced in our requirement to limit the party actually seeing the President to three or four.

By way of being as forthcoming as possible, we believe we should make the following proposition to the Omanis, upon their arrival at Blair House: that some additional members of the party would be welcome to accompany the Sultan to the White House, and to be present in the Cabinet Room when the Sultan signs the guest book, but not to meet the President. While the Sultan, Special Advisor Sayyid Tarik, Foreign Minister Zawawi and possibly Ambassador Macki are in with the President, others would wait in the Cabinet Room. We would expect that this group would include Foreign Policy Advisor Ghassan Shakir, Foreign Policy Advisor Yahya Omar, and perhaps Minister of Communications Abdul Hafidh Salim Rajab. Assistant Secretary Atherton and Country Director Dickman would be available to spend time with this outer group until the meeting with the President ends.

Request approval.

If approved, request further that:

- a) The Cabinet Room be reserved for this outer group. (i.e., from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m.)
- b) Appropriate National Security Council staff members also be designated to be present in the Cabinet Room at 2:30 to meet with this outer group.

George S. Springsteen
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

7500222
XR-7500221

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D C 20520

January 7, 1975


UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ambassador Wolle's Participation in
Sultan Qaboos' Visit

Ambassador Wolle, who is back in Washington from Muscat for consultation, has been included as a participant during Sultan Qaboos' meeting with the Secretary of State in the social functions that are being organized in honor of the Sultan. Ambassador Wolle's participation during Sultan Qaboos' call on the President on Thursday, January 9, remains undecided.

The Omani group calling on the President includes, in addition to the Sultan, Foreign Minister Zawawi, Sayyid Tarik who is the uncle and personal adviser to the Sultan, and Omani Ambassador to the United States Ahmed Macki. We believe it would be fitting if Ambassador Wolle were also present.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		G NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
18	1	9	10		7500157	Calley

TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____ S/S 7500494 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ OTHER _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT + SCHLESINGER, J _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC + S CODEWORD
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Omanis seek to expand the number of participants in the Helms & McIntyre*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPT.

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK (*)
STAFF SECRETARY <i>Tavran</i>		X		MEMO FOR PRES ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	+			MEMO TO ()
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE. ASAP
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
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OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
1/9	Davis	NSC/S		Close out 117 & 157, Davis LDXed memo to State.	
1/9				C Davis LDXed Memo to Springsteen	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F <u>JAN 1</u> BY <u>D/5</u> JAN 1 CRT ID: <u>117</u> SA SF OPEN <u>mw</u> HP NS CLOSE <u>mw</u> WH EP PA DY
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: <u>ma LDX - 1-7-75</u>	
	CROSS REF W/ <u>7405883</u> <u>750015, 750017</u>	
SUSPENSE _____	SCHEDULED: <u>+</u> FOLDER: _____	

377

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Attached is a thank you message from the Sultan of Oman who visited Washington and met with the President on January 9, 1975. As a thank you message, it requires no further action. Separately, however, the Sultan will be receiving a thank you letter from the President for gifts presented by the Sultan during his visit. Close out.

rosemary nichuss

[NSC/S Copy of original incoming should be sent to State.]



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR TERRY O'DONNELL

FROM: MAJOR BARRETT

The following message from the Sultan of Oman was received Saturday evening at approximately 9:20 p.m. from the Sultan's aircraft as he was departing the country:

"Mr. President, as I depart from your fine country, I take the opportunity to express my deep appreciation for your generous hospitality extended to myself and the members of my staff. My few days in Washington and the friendly meetings held with yourself and your Administration have been most useful and I look forward to continuing our relationship between our two countries. All week a solid foundation has been laid once again. Mr. President, please accept my deep thanks. I wish you and your family and the people of the USA the very best of happiness and prosperity".



ANCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
1	13	1	20	11	7500377	Oakley	

TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____ S/S _____
 KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ OTHER _____
 SCOWCROFT + _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ C _____
 DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S _____
 TS _____

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 LOU NO FORN NODIS
 C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 S CODEWORD
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Mr. J. B. Said the Sultan of Oman to the press as he departed the U.S. from his recent mtg w/ the Pres*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPT

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

NSC/5 DISP INSTR

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		
	ACTION	INFO
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		<u>+</u>
STAFF SECRETARY		
FAR EAST		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA		
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		
EUROPE / CANADA	<u>+</u>	
LATIN AMERICA		
UNITED NATIONS		
ECONOMIC		
SCIENTIFIC		
PROGRAM ANALYSIS		
NSC PLANNING		
CONGRESSIONAL		
OCEANS POLICY		
INTELLIGENCE		

ACTION REQUIRED
 MEMO FOR HAK SCOWCROFT +
 MEMO FOR PRES _____
 REPLY FOR _____
 APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
 MEMO _____ TO _____
 RECOMMENDATIONS _____
 JOINT MEMO _____
 REFER TO _____ FOR _____
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
 CONCURRENCE _____
 DUE DATE. 1-27

COMMENTS (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN)	CY TO
1/23/75	Oakley	NSC/5	C	No further action	

DISPATCH _____
 CY RQMTS. SEE ABOVE PLUS _____
 NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 CROSS REF W/ 2500134
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
M/F'D <u>1/23/75</u>	
CRT ID. <u>CD</u>	SA SF
OPEN <u>GAB</u>	HP NS
CLOSE <u>GAB</u>	WH EP
	PA DY